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1 Executive Summary 
Current transportation funding mechanisms (most notably the gas tax) are inadequate to fund the 
United States‟ transportation infrastructure needs through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) due to 
a combination of inflation and increased fuel efficiency.  As a result, many policymakers and 
transportation policy experts have recommended a transition from the current gas tax system to a 
fee on vehicle miles traveled (VMT).  Previous studies of a VMT tax, including those conducted 
by several congressionally-chartered commissions, indicate that this transition will result in a 
more stable funding source for transportation infrastructure that acts as a true user fee on all 
vehicles, including those powered by alternative fuels.  However, concerns have arisen regarding 
the distributional impacts of a VMT tax, particularly the concern that it will exert a 
disproportionately negative impact on low-income drivers and rural drivers.  Data from the 2009 
National Household Travel Survey was examined to determine the impact of a potential 
transition on rural and low-income drivers in North Carolina.   
 Analysis of the data from the 2009 NHTS suggests that, for North Carolina drivers, a 
revenue-neutral VMT fee would not be significantly more regressive than the current gas tax.  
Rather, the average gas tax paid by North Carolina drivers per vehicle decreases under a revenue 
neutral VMT fee.  Assuming that VMT will continue to decrease as individuals drive less due to 
rising gas prices, the average tax paid under a VMT fee will continue to decrease even further 
relative to the current gas tax.  While rural and urban low-income drivers pay less in taxes than 
non-low income drivers, these individuals and households pay a higher percentage of their 
incomes in fuel taxes.  This would not significantly change under a VMT fee, as the total tax 
paid would only decrease by less than a dollar for most groups.  Policymakers should press for a 
transition to a VMT fee due to its relative stability compared to the gas tax as well as its 
adherence to the “user pays” principle.  This study does not, however, examine the impacts of 
higher revenue levels (increasing the gas tax or the VMT fee).  The burdens of either a higher 
gas tax or increased VMT fee rates can be alleviated by adjusting the Earned Income Tax Credit 
to account for VMT as well as supporting funding for public transportation in both urban and 
rural areas. 
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1 Introduction 
The greatest dilemma facing transportation policy today is one of funding, especially at the 
federal level.  The problem has been documented time and time again by organizations and 
lobbying groups as divergent as the US Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO for a simple 
reason:  the US government lacks the funds to maintain a crumbling system of rapidly 
deteriorating infrastructure: a multitude of roads and rails, bridges and tunnels, and transit 
systems which propel the country‟s citizens and economy cannot adequately be maintained with 
current funding levels.   The American Society of Civil Engineers drove this point home last year 
by giving the nation‟s infrastructure a grade of “D-.”   
From a funding perspective, the solution is clear: revenue for the Highway Trust Fund 
must be increased by both raising the motor fuels tax (currently at 18.4 cents a gallon) and/or 
transitioning to a tax on Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT).  Such is the recommendation of the 
National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, authorized by Congress 
in section 11142 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity act: A 
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).  However, before Congress embraces this policy decision, it 
should identify the potential impacts of such a transition on those who would, in theory, be least 
able to cope with an increase in the cost of driving: the poor, who already pay a higher share of 
their income in gas taxes than those with higher incomes; and those living in rural areas, where 
the built environment and transportation options do not allow for adjustment of travel behavior 
as readily as urban areas. 
This paper is structured in the following manner.  Section two provides both a policy 
background to the gas tax and the Highway Trust Fund.  Section three focuses on a discussion of 
current and previous literature on the gas tax, VMT tax, and the distributional effects of each.  
Section four details methodology used, including data collection and analysis.  Section five 
provides a summary and discussion of the results.  Section six concludes, including policy 
recommendations.  
1.1 Policy and Theoretical Background 
This paper does not aspire to provide an exhaustive account of the Federal Trannsportation 
reauthorization process.
1
  Rather, it attempts to examine the impacts of current and future 
transportation funding instruments on North Carolina residents, especially the poor and those 
living in rural areas without access to modes of travel other than the automobile.   
As of January 3
rd
, 2011, the average price of unleaded gas in the United States was $3.07 
per gallon.
2
  This represented a 40 cent increase over the previous year (15%) and an 83 cent 
increase over the last 5 years (37%).  To say that these increases have registered with the general 
                                                          
1
 This is admirably achieved by Joshua Schank and Costas Panagopoulous’ All Roads lead to Congress: the 300 
Billion Dollar Fight over Highway Funding (Washington: CQ Press, 2007). 
2
 Energy Information Administration.  “Weekly U.S. retail Gasoline Prices” 
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public and elected officials would be an understatement.  High gas prices have been used as a 
raison d‟être by both conservative and liberal politicians and pundits to advocate for a plethora of 
policy choices ranging from increased domestic production of oil, the development of ethanol, 
hydrogen, and other alternative fuel sources for automobiles, and increased funding for urban 
transit, intercity rail, and bicycle/pedestrian infrastructure. The last several years have also borne 
witness to calls to actually decrease the gas tax, or to suspend it during the summer driving 
season.  This most famously occurred during the 2008 election, when escalating gas prices 
prompted the presidential campaigns of Hillary Clinton and John McCain to call for a gas tax 
holiday, a move copied by several state legislatures.  Although no such proposal ever became 
law, the proposals serve as a stark reminder of the ease with which the gas tax can be utilized as 
a blunt political tool rather than a non-partisan policy instrument.   
Two primary levels of taxation currently exist within the transportation world: a federal 
gasoline tax of 18.4 cents/gallon and a varying range of state-level fuel taxes (the lowest is 
Alaska, which has no state gas tax; the highest is California with a state fuel tax of 46.1 
cents/gallon) (   Though this paper primarily focuses on Federal policy instruments for 
transportation finance, the ability of states to serve as “laboratories of democracy” and introduce 
new policy instruments that can be scaled up to the federal level should not be overlooked.  
Oregon, for instance, recently completed an extensive pilot program for a VMT tax that has 
provided policymakers and advisors with valuable data concerning the effectiveness, efficiency, 
and equity of shifting from a gas tax to a VMT tax.  Many other states, including North Carolina, 
have indexed their state gas tax to inflation, ensuring that the purchasing power of each dollar 
collected will not decrease with time. 
Though the federal gas tax was initially created in 1930 (during the midst of the Great 
Depression, no less) the era of modern Federal Transportation Policy began with the creation of 
the Eisenhower National Defense Interstate System and the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) in 1956.  
Prior to its creation, the federal gas tax was simply allocated to the general fund.  The Highway 
Revenue Act of 1956, which served as the enabling legislation for the HTF, allocated an 
increased three cent gas tax exclusively to highway building.   
 The federal HTF, as well as its state counterparts, shifted the funding of infrastructure in 
the United States.  Rather than being appropriated yearly like other federal departments (the 
Department of Defense, for example) the HTF ensures that revenues from transportation sources, 
including the gas tax and diesel tax, as well as taxes on new trucks ant tires, will be used for 
transportation purposes primarily through a series of budgetary “firewalls.”  Additionally, the 
HTF allows for greater coordination between state departments of transportation and the US 
DOT through “contract authority,” which allows these agencies to anticipate federal funding 
levels and plan projects accordingly.  Finally, the inauguration of the Highway Trust Fund and 
the dedication of gas taxes exclusively towards transportation projects instituted the “user pays” 
principle, which has initiated a heated debate (unexplored in this study) between federal funding 
for highways and public transportation. 
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2 Comparison of revenue streams (Gas Tax, VMT tax) 
The current national gas tax is currently set at 18.4 cents a gallon, which is 
complemented by taxes on other transportation resources, the most common being a tax on diesel 
fuel of 24.4 cents a gallon.  Additionally, the federal gas tax is supplemented by state-level gas 
taxes, which rates ranging from no gas tax (Alaska) to 46.1 cents per gallon (California).  Most 
people view the gas tax as a user fee; a necessary evil enacted in order to pay for the country‟s 
transportation infrastructure.  However, as a user fee, the current 18.4¢ gas tax currently faces 
duel challenges in the form of inflation and gas mileage. Numerous literature documents both 
these issues, including Litman (1999) and Wachs (2003, 2007).  The real value of the gas tax has 
declined due to inflation, while improvements in fuel economy, especially recent policy changes 
that will increase CAFE standards for both light and heavy vehicles.  Additionally, the current 
system is only a user fee by proxy.  That is, people are paying not for how much they drive, but 
for how much gas they consume.  This research has led to growing calls to change the way that 
the Federal Government finances transportation, including proposals to raise the current gas tax 
(Wachs 2007), switch from a fuel tax to a distance-based VMT tax (Whitty 2007, McMullan et al 
2010), or institute a carbon tax as part of comprehensive climate legislation (Metcalf et al 2008, 
Sterner 2007).   
Absent the question of whether it is politically feasible to institute any serious reforms of 
federal transportation finance, be it through the traditional reauthorization process or as part of 
comprehensive climate legislation, the above research supports aggressive changes in federal 
transportation finance, including the introduction of new revenue streams.  There are, however, 
some disadvantages and difficulties facing an implementation of a VMT fee in the United States.  
In addition to equity concerns (which are the subject of this study), transitioning to a VMT fee 
raises two primary issues: one of implementation and one of privacy (though the two issues are 
related).  In order to assess a VMT fee to drivers, state and federal agencies will need to obtain 
data regarding each vehicle‟s annual VMT.  Two methods have been proposed to obtain this 
information.  Under the first scenario, one‟s annual VMT is recorded through the simple reading 
of the odometer each time the automobile is inspected, with a bill then being assessed to the 
owner of the vehicle.  This has raised the charge that such a process would be open to fraud.  
While odometer fraud is already illegal (and, thanks to changes in vehicle technology, 
increasingly difficult to successfully achieve), it is a noteworthy concern, particularly for older 
cars.  Additionally, the collection of VMT fees would be dependent on individuals voluntarily 
having their cars inspected (even though states require annual inspections, getting one‟s car 
inspected is not as essential to driving as purchasing gasoline).   
The second option involves the installation of GPS devices in automobiles.  Under this 
proposal, GPS transponders, installed in new automobiles, would transmit the amount of VMT to 
the agency responsible for collection via wireless computer.  This could also allow state and 
local agencies to levy their own fees based, for instance, on congestion levels or road conditions.  
This flexibility and efficiency is offset somewhat by the increased collection costs involved in 
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both scenarios.  Additionally, many have expressed concern about the presence of GPS devices 
in private automobiles sending data about an individual‟s driving to the federal government.  
While the system could be designed in a way that would minimize privacy issues, concerns about 
privacy have dominated public opposition to a VMT fee and made such a transition politically 
difficult, as illustrated below.   
The following table illustrates proposed changes in transportation tax rates for both the 
gas tax and a hypothetical VMT fee.  It is worth noting that, according to the NSTIFC, the VMT 
fee rate necessary to either maintain or improve the condition of infrastructure in the United 
States is more than twice the rate necessary to maintain current levels of revenue. 
Table 2.1 Recommended changes in Federal transportation tax rates 
Tax Rate (increase) Notes
3
 
18.4 cents/gallon (n/a Current Federal Gas Tax 
28.4 cents/gallon ($0.10) Immediate increase recommended by NSTIFC 
33.4 cents/gallon ($0.15) Immediate increase recommended by Presidential Deficit 
Commission (Simpson-Bowles) 
0.9 cents/mile (n/a) VMT tax needed to maintain 2008 HTF revenues (NSTIFC) 
1.3 cents/mile (0.004) VMT tax needed to maintain 2008 Federal Transportation Spending 
levels (NSTIFC) 
1.4 cents/mile (0.005) VMT tax needed to maintain 2008 augmented HTF levels (NSTIFC) 
1.9 cents/mile (0.01) VMT tax needed to maintain infrastructure condition (NSTIFC) 
2.3 cents/mile (0.014) VMT tax needed to improve infrastructure condition (NSTIFC) 
 
Unfortunately, no political support currently exists for major reform of transportation 
policy such as raising the gas tax, indexing the gas tax to inflation, or transitioning over the long-
term to a VMT tax.  This was illustrated quite succinctly in 2009, when an off-handed comment 
by Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood recommending a long-term transition to a VMT 
charge was quickly swatted down by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, who stated that 
a VMT tax would not be the policy of the Obama administration. 
Despite the unwillingness and/or inability of lawmakers to come to a consensus on this 
issue, it is evident that the system of transportation finance currently in place in the United States 
is inadequate to the needs of the 21
st
 century.  This is articulated most effectively by Martin 
Wachs, who argues that current gas tax rates lead to an overconsumption of roadways and a shift 
towards other, less equitable revenue streams (such as income, property, or sales taxes) to pay for 
transportation investments (Wachs 2003).  Parry and Small (2007) attempt to explain the gas tax 
as a means to internalize the externalities (such as congestion, resource consumption, and 
pollution) caused by driving.  From this point of view, the gas tax acts as a Pigovian tax that 
serves primarily to counter the “low” price of gasoline.  While Parry and Small‟s view is not 
unique, and constitutes a valid argument in the theoretical and logical contexts, it would be fair 
                                                          
3
 Source: Final Report of the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, 2008 
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to say such a view represents only a small minority of the American public.  Regardless of the 
outcome of that debate, representatives from both camps would find consensus in initiating a 
transition to a VMT fee as soon as possible.  Both advocates of a VMT fee as an internalization 
of externalities and proponents of the user pays principle recognize the ability of the VMT fee to 
act as a fairer and more accurate indicator of driving use despite concerns about privacy, 
implementation, and equity.   
2.1  Equity impacts of the Gas Tax and VMT tax 
These predictions of improved revenue stability and resulting driver efficiency are often tempered 
by the concern that gasoline (and, for that matter, all other excise taxes) are regressive, 
exercising an undue impact on the poor and those dependent on a car for transportation.  The 
driver-level effect of shifting from a gas tax to a VMT tax will greatly depend on whether or not 
drivers can adjust to any possible change in the cost of driving.  For some, this is easy.  Those 
who can absorb the price increase will continue their current travel behavior.  Those who cannot 
absorb the price will change their behavior if possible.  A lot of this has to do with income and 
the built environment.  A driver living in Washington DC, for instance, will likely be able to 
adjust to the increase in price due to the presence of reliable alternative forms of transportation 
such as biking, walking, and public transit.   However, a driver living in rural North Carolina (in, 
say, Madison or Dare Counties) will, due to the nature of the built environment and the longer 
travel distances required, will not be able to shift travel towards alternative modes of transport. 
Low income drivers are primarily affected by tax increases due to the regressive nature of 
the gas tax.  Since all users pay the same rate per gallon, an individual making 15,000 dollars a 
year who drives the same amount as an individual making 60,000 dollars a year would spend a 
much higher percentage of their income on gas (and, hence, the gas tax).  A low-income driver 
living in a rural area would theoretically be harmed much more by an increase in annual taxes 
paid than a high-income driver living in an urban area, both because the rural driver cannot as 
easily change their travel behavior and because they would pay a higher percentage of their total 
income in taxes. 
Past research (Poterba 1989, 1991) has revealed, however, that the tax is not as regressive 
as widely believed, especially when the tax is viewed as a percentage of expenditures rather than 
income.  Nonetheless, changes in gasoline prices (of which the gas tax is a small part) can have 
an impact on expenditures as basic as groceries (Gicheva et al 2008).  Despite this impact, the 
overall consensus among the body of research finds that In contrast, a study of Oregon‟s pilot 
VMT tax program found that higher income levels were associated with a larger amount of miles 
driven during rush hour (Whitty 2007).    The argument regarding the inequitable nature of the 
gas tax applies not only to differences in income, which follows that low-income families pay a 
higher percentage of their total earnings in gas tax than higher-income families, but also to issues 
of built environment.  In this regard, living in an urban environment, which increases the 
feasibility of alternative transportation options such as transit, biking, and walking, reduces ones 
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dependence on the automobile.  Extensive research exists concerning the exact nature of this 
relationship, which is unclear.   
 The most relevant research to this study, however, is a recent examination of Oregon‟s 
VMT fee pilot program (McMullan et al 2010), which compared the distributional impacts of the 
program among urban and rural residents and found several models of a VMT tax to be even 
more regressive in terms of income than a gasoline tax while benefiting rural residents more than 
urban residents due to differences in fuel economy and VMT. Under Oregon‟s pilot program, 
However, what holds true for Oregon may not hold true for North Carolina, and this study will 
attempt to provide an examination of whether the equity concerns alleviated in part by the 
Oregon study hold true across a larger sample size in a different area of the country. 
3 METHODS 
3.1 Study Area 
Rather than comparing tax rates, demographic information, and travel behavior across 
multiple states or even the country as a whole, this study focused on trends and respondents from 
the state of North Carolina.  This was mainly done for two reasons.  First, North Carolina‟s 
relatively large number of respondents in the 2009 NHTS, largely due to the presence of 2 “add-
on” samples requested by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (5,000) and the 
Piedmont Regional Transportation Authority (5,000), allows for a detailed investigation of driver 
behavior.  Second, focusing on one state simplifies the analysis process by canceling out the 
impacts of different state fuel tax rates and geographical differences in cost of living. Even 
though North Carolina and Virginia residents pay the same 18.4 cents a gallon in federal gas 
taxes, North Carolina‟s state gas tax rate of 30.2 cents per gallon far outstrips Virginia‟s state tax 
rate of 17.5 cents per gallon.  Additionally, since there has been some discussion at the state level 
about transitioning from a gas tax to a VMT tax, this study would have use for policymakers in 
Raleigh as well as Washington. 
3.2 The National Household Travel Survey  
This study utilized the most recent National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) conducted 
between Spring 2008 and Spring 2009 and released in the fall of 2010.  The Survey is conducted 
by the US Department of Transportation‟s Federal Highway Administration every 6-8 years, 
with the prior study being conducted in 2001.  The NHTS is intended to provide a detailed 
snapshot of American travel behavior.  The data used for this study can be divided into two 
categories: travel data and demographic data.  Travel data used included annual vehicle miles 
traveled („BESTMILE‟) and an estimate of the combined fuel economy of each vehicle 
(„EIADMPG‟).  Demographic data included a categorical definition of income („HHFAMINC‟) 
and an indicator of whether the respondent lived in a census defined rural or urban area 
(„URBRUR‟).   
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The 2009 NHTS proved especially beneficial for those interested in North Carolina due to 
the presence of 2 “add-on” samples requested by the North Carolina Department of 
Transportation (5,000) and the Piedmont Regional Transportation Authority (5,000).  These two 
“add-ons” greatly increased the total sample size and allowed for a more accurate representation 
of North Carolina citizens‟ travel behavior and demographic information. 
Several assumptions were made in the calculation of tax paid.  As mentioned previously, the 
US government collects taxes on the purchase of both gasoline and diesel fuels.  However, for 
purposes of this study we assumed, due to the very low percentage of respondents with diesel 
cars, that all respondents would pay the same tax rate regardless of fuel type. 
This study utilized a “static” model to calculate the differences in taxes paid by each vehicle.  
In essence, this means that an assumption was made that driver behavior, manifested in vehicle 
miles traveled, would not significantly change as a result of a transition to a VMT fee, essentially 
assuming that the price elasticity of demand of gasoline was perfectly inelastic, or zero.  
Obviously, this is not the case, though there is no real consensus regarding the price elasticity of 
gasoline.  In order to analyze the impact of price elasticity on the average tax paid, then, I 
conducted a series of sensitivity analyses using price elasticities collected from literature, with a 
conservative estimate of -0.077 and a high estimate of -0.21.
4
   
I then calculated the annual tax paid for each respondent based on the best estimate of annual 
vehicle miles traveled („bestmile‟), an adjusted EPA combined fuel economy („eiadmpg‟) and 
the above tax rates.  Although the NHTS also included a self-reported estimate of vehicle miles 
traveled collected using a single method, I chose to use the „bestmile‟ variable due to the higher 
likelihood of accuracy in the latter variable.   
I derived the amount of gas tax paid (under the current rate of 18.4 cents a gallon) per respondent 
using the following formula: 
Gas Tax Paid = (Annual VMT/Vehicle Fuel Economy) * Federal Gas Tax Rate 
Likewise, I derived the amount of VMT tax paid per respondent using the following formula 
(assuming a level of VMT tax that would maintain 2008 HTF revenue levels, 0.9 cents/mile): 
VMT Fee Paid = Annual VMT*Revenue Neutral VMT Fee Rate 
In both instances, respondents who refused to give an annual VMT estimate approximately were 
excluded from the analysis.   
                                                          
4
Jonathan E. Hughes, Christopher R. Knittel, and Daniel Sperling, 2008.  “Evidence of a Shift in the 
Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand.”  The Energy Journal, International Association 
for Energy Economics, vol. 29(1), pages 113-134.  
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 Once an annual tax paid variable was derived for each respondent in the 2009 NHTS, I 
determined the average tax paid based on annual household family income and built environment 
setting for each of the eight tax scenarios.  Since this study focuses on the impacts of taxation on 
low-income earners in particular, we created a dummy variable entitled “lowinc” in which 
households making less than $15,000 a year were given a value of 1 and all other households 
were given a value of 0.  The value of $15,000 was chosen as a dividing point in order to 
approximate the 2008 US Census Bureau poverty threshold of $14,417 for a household of two 
individuals.
5
    For purposes of this study, therefore, households making less than $15,000 a year 
will be referred to as “low income” while those making more than $15,000 a year will be 
referred to as “non-low income.” 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Demographic Trends 
Of the 301,431 respondents in the 2009 NHTS vehicle file, 23,258 were from North 
Carolina.  This number decreases further when one includes only the number of vehicles from 
North Carolina that reported Vehicle Miles Traveled („bestmile‟ under the 2009 NHTS) to 
21,662 vehicles.  While the 2009 NHTS has not, as of this writing, provided block group or tract 
information regarding the location of the respondents (in the form of block-group level FIPS 
codes), the dataset provides data in regards to the combined metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) 
of each respondent.  These results are shown in Table 4.1.1.   
Table 4.1.1  CMSA locations of 2009 NHTS vehicle respondents in North Carolina 
Household CMSA Number of Vehicles (%) 
Appropriate Skip (not in MSA) 5,623 (25.96) 
Charlotte-Gastonia 928 (4.28) 
Greensboro-Winston Salem-High 
Point 
11,177 (51.60) 
Virginia Beach, VA 61 (0.28) 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 1,041 (4.81) 
Suppressed (CMSA < 1,000,000) 2,832 (13.07) 
 
The Piedmont-Triad CMSA stands out in particular, as Piedmont Regional Transit 
requested an additional “add-on” sample that presumably focused on that CMSA.  However, due 
to the built environment within that CMSA, the additional responses were not heavily skewed 
towards an “urban” built environment.  Rather, as table 4.1.2 demonstrates, the total number of 
vehicles based on built environment (across the state as a whole) was relatively balanced.  There 
were 1,646 more vehicles belonging to urban households than rural households, while only 7.8% 
of all vehicles belonged to low income households.   
 
                                                          
5
 Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh08.html 
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Table 4.1.2 Number (Percent) of Vehicles per Household based on Income Level and Built Environment Type 
Built Environment Type Low Income Not Low Income Totals 
Urban 799 (3.7) 10,855 (50.1) 11,654 (53.8) 
Rural 903 (4.2) 9,105 (42.0) 10,008 (46.2) 
Total 1,702 (7.9) 19,960 (92.1) 21,662 (100.0) 
 
One drawback of this study is the lack of information in the 2009 NHTS vehicle file 
regarding households with no automobile present.  As table 4.1.5 demonstrates, a majority of 
households (66.64%) in North Carolina had either two or three vehicles.  Additionally, according 
to the 2009 NHTS household file, only 435 households (3.92%) had 0 vehicles.   
Table 4.13 Number of Vehicles per North Carolina Household 
Number of Vehicles per 
Household 
Frequency (%) 
1 2,361 (10.90) 
2 8,258 (38.12) 
3 6,178 (28.52) 
4 2,989 (13.80) 
5 1,164 (5.37) 
6+ 712 (3.29) 
 
4.2 Vehicle and Travel Trends 
After removing vehicles with no reported annual VMT (The average self-reported annual 
vehicle miles traveled by North Carolina drivers (“bestmile” in the NHTS dataset) in 2008 was 
10,987.46 miles.  However, this is a bit misleading as the set is skewed by several respondents 
who reported very high levels of VMT (40,000+ miles per year).  The median level of VMT for 
North Carolina vehicles was 9,136.92 miles, almost 2,000 miles lower than the mean. 
Table 4.2.1 Average Annual Vehicle Miles Traveled for North Carolina Vehicles in Urban and Rural Areas 
Built Environment Type Low Income Not Low Income Total 
Urban 9,436.15 10,940.77 10,837.61 
Rural 9,310.97 11,125.41 11,161.96 
Total 9,369.73 11,125.41 10,987.46 
 
Vehicles belonging to rural drivers exhibited higher levels of annual VMT than urban 
drivers.  This is consistent with past research, including Ewing and Cervero (2001) which 
indicate that higher concentrations of land use allow urban drivers the ability to travel less in 
order to reach their destinations as well as utilizing alternative modes of travel where such 
options exist. 
Rural drivers in North Carolina traveled more miles per year than their urban 
counterparts, with rural vehicles averaging 324 more miles per year than urban vehicles.    
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Similarly, vehicles belonging to households that made more than $15,000 per year traveled an 
average of 1,755 more miles than vehicles belonging to households that made less than $15,000 
a year.  As expected, the section of the population with the lowest annual VMT encompasses 
vehicles belonging to the urban poor.  Although urban drivers on whole drive less than their rural 
counterparts, low-income drivers, faced with a limited budget and travel options such as public 
transportation not available to rural drivers, will choose (or be forced to) drive less. 
4.2.2 Average Fuel Economy for North Carolina Vehicles based on Built Environment and Income 
Built Environment Type Low Income Not Low Income Total 
Urban 19.54 21.06 20.96 
Rural 19.15 20.56 20.43 
Totals 19.33 20.84 20.72 
 
Although urban households have, on average, more fuel efficient vehicles than rural 
households, the difference in fuel economy is slight, with only 0.48 miles per gallon separating 
the two.  Fuel economy for low-income household vehicles is greatly lower than those of non-
low income households (1.43).  This is consistent with previous studies.  At most, only 0.91 mpg 
separates the highest sector (Urban non-low income vehicles) from the lowest sector (rural low 
income vehicles).   
4.3 The Current Gas Tax 
Based upon current data regarding vehicle miles traveled and fuel economy for each vehicle, 
North Carolina drivers paid an average of $99.33 in federal gas taxes in 2009.  However, this 
figure is somewhat misleading, as the mean number is skewed both by outlier drivers with high 
annual vehicle miles traveled (and therefore outlying levels of gas tax paid).  Additionally, as 
seen below, different demographic groups paid very different levels of gas tax.   
Table 4.3.1 Average Gas Tax paid by rural and urban vehicles in North Carolina 
Built Environment Type Low Income Non Low Income Total 
Urban 84.98 96.85 96.04 
Rural 86.13 105.51 103.16 
Total 85.60 100.50 99.33 
 
Under the current gas tax rate, rural drivers in North Carolina pay an average of $7.12 more per 
year in gas taxes (per vehicle) than urban drivers.  Households making more than $15,000 a year 
paid, on average, $14.90 more per vehicle in gas taxes than households making less than $15,000 
a year.   
 Table 5.3.4 highlights the discrepancy within each demographic group.  Although low 
income drivers pay less in gas taxes than non-low income drivers, rural low-income drivers, 
according to the results, pay $1.15 more in gas taxes per year than their urban counterparts.  This 
small difference pales in comparison, however, to the difference between urban low-income and 
13 
 
non-low income drivers ($11.87) and rural low-income and non-low income drivers ($19.38).  
This difference would be exaggerated if one were to also consider the percentage of tax paid as a 
portion of the individuals income.   
4.4 A Revenue-Neutral VMT Fee 
 
The VMT fee rate used for this study was set at a level (0.9 cents per mile) that ensured 
revenue levels necessary to match the revenue brought into the HTF in 2008.  While this may be 
impractical for future policymaking purposes (as current levels of funding are insufficient to 
maintain the Trust Fund‟s solvency) it allows for a better comparison of tax collection systems, 
since increasing funding levels for the HTF would undoubtedly increase the amount of tax paid 
as well as the burden on low-income and rural households. 
   
Table 4.4.1 Crosstabs, Average Annual VMT Fee Paid (in dollars) for North Carolina Vehicles based on Built 
Environment and Income (Price Elasticity of Demand for Gas = 0) 
Built Environment Type Low Income Not Low Income Totals 
Urban 84.92 98.46 97.53 
Rural 83.79 102.11 100.46 
Totals 84.32 100.12 98.88 
 
Using an elasticity of 0, the average tax paid by North Carolina drivers under a revenue-
neutral VMT fee was $98.88, 45 cents less than under the current gas tax (p=0.62).  This might 
initially seem strange, since the VMT fee rate is designed to be revenue neutral.  However, the 
rate recommended by the NSTIF commission was designed to be revenue neutral across the 
entire country, so variances by state may be expected.   
 
Table 4.4.2 Average Annual VMT Tax Paid (in Dollars) by Urban and Rural Households in North Carolina 
Built Environment 
Type 
Average Annual Gas Tax 
paid (18.4 cents/gallon) 
Average Annual VMT 
Tax paid (0.9 cents/mile) 
Urban $96.04 $97.53 
Rural $103.16 $100.46 
 
As with the current gas tax, a revenue-neutral VMT tax results in rural drivers paying a 
higher average tax than urban drivers.  However, rural drivers pay significantly less in VMT fees 
than they pay under the current gas tax (p=0.03).  There is no significant difference in the 
amount of VMT fees paid by urban drivers relative to the current gas tax.  
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Table 4.4.3 Average Annual VMT Tax Paid (in Dollars) by low income and non-low income households in North 
Carolina 
Income Level Average Annual Gas Tax 
paid (18.4 cents/gallon) 
Average Annual VMT 
Tax paid (0.9 cents/mile) 
Household Income < $15,000 85.60 84.32 
Household Income > $15,000 100.50 100.12 
 
As expected, households making less than $15,000 a year pay less in VMT fees than households 
making more than $15,000 a year.  This difference, however, is miniscule and statistically 
insignificant (p=0.35).  Just as with the gas tax, however, this figure is somewhat misleading, 
and a VMT fee still disproportionately impacts low-income household in terms of percentage of 
income paid in fees.     Nonetheless, under a revenue-netural VMT fee, both low-income and 
higher income drivers in North Carolina pay less in taxes than under the existing gas tax system.  
This is further illuminated by table 4.4.4, which provides a glimpse of how varying income 
groups are impacted by the transition. 
 
Table 4.4.4 Gas Tax and VMT Fee paid by income group 
Income Level 
Gas 
Tax 
VMT 
Fee 
Difference (*= 
significant at p=0.05) 
<5,000 94.37 95.76 1.38 
5,000-9,999 89.11 86.58 -2.53 
10,000-14,999 80.50 79.15 -1.35 
15,000-19,999 83.49 83.22 -0.27 
20,000-24,999 84.64 83.57 -1.07 
25,000-29,999 83.66 83.50 -0.16 
30,000-34,999 95.49 95.40 -0.09 
35,000-39,999 93.19 93.12 -0.07 
40,000-44,999 97.11 94.97 -2.14 
45,000-49,999 96.74 96.39 -0.35 
50,000-54,999 102.68 102.09 -0.59 
55,000-59,999 103.55 102.56 -0.99 
60,000-64,999 105.01 103.31 -1.70 
65,000-69,999 102.25 102.48 0.24 
70,000-74,999 103.21 105.16 1.95 
75,000-79,999 102.37 101.09 -1.28 
80,000-99,999 106.34 107.84 1.51 
>=100,000 114.65 113.69 -0.96 
 
4.5 VMT Fee - Variations in Demand Elasticity 
This study initially assumed perfect inelasticity with regards to the demand for gasoline – 
that if the cost of driving increased as a result of shifting from a gas tax to a VMT fee that drivers 
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would not change their travel behavior.  This is a generous assumption, and while it is generally 
true that the elasticity of demand for gasoline is relatively inelastic, it is by no means 0.  A 
survey of recent literature on the subject offers estimates of the short-run price elasticity of 
demand for gasoline ranging from as little as -0.034 to -0.31 (Hughes et al 2008).  However, any 
transition to a VMT fee will not occur in a vacuum.  Rather, it will be accompanied by increases 
in the cost of gas as, barring a technological breakthrough, the primary source of fuel for 
automobiles continues to increase in scarcity.  As such, I conducted a sensitivity analysis of the 
new VMT fee to simulate the impact of increased gas prices on a VMT fee.  Both scenarios 
assumed a decrease in VMT (due either to the transition to a VMT fee or a continued increase in 
the price of gas), after which the VMT fee paid was calculated using the aforementioned formula 
used to calculate the original fee. 
Table 4.5.1 Average Annual VMT Fee Paid (in dollars) for North Carolina Vehicles based on Built Environment 
and Income (Assuming Decrease in VMT of 5%) 
Built Environment Type Low Income Not Low Income Total 
Urban 80.68 93.54 92.66 
Rural 79.61 97.00 95.43 
Total 80.11 95.12 93.94 
 
Table 4.5.2 Average Annual VMT Fee Paid (in dollars) for North Carolina Vehicles based on Built Environment 
and Income (Assuming Decerease in VMT of 10%) 
Built Environment Type Low Income Not Low Income Total 
Urban 76.43 88.62 87.78 
Rural 75.42 91.90 90.41 
Total 75.89 90.12 89.00 
 
Under both scenarios, the total amount of VMT tax paid decreases in proportion to the decrease 
in vehicle miles traveled.  Under the former scenario (in which VMT decreases by 5 %), using a 
conservative elasticity of -0.077 provided by Hughes (2008) assumes that the cost of a gallon of 
gasoline will increase to $6.07 from the current price of $3.68 (an increase of $2.39).  The latter 
scenario assumes that the cost of a gallon of gas will increase to $8.47 from the current price of 
$3.68 (an increase of $4.78).  In both of these scenarios, the primary driving force on the 
increase in gas prices would be increases in demand and/or reductions in supply, not an increase 
in excise tax rates. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Both the VMT fee and the gas tax are regressive, requiring low-income households to spend 
more of their earnings on travel than higher income households.  This study does not question 
that premise.  Rather, the North Carolina data from the 2009 NHTS effectively refutes the idea 
that transitioning to a VMT fee from the current gas tax would increase the negative impact on 
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low-income or rural drivers relative to urban or non-low income drivers.  In fact, assuming a 
revenue-neutral VMT fee rate, switching from a gas tax to a VMT fee would reduce the burden 
on low-income and rural vehicles and households.  This is not to say that low-income and rural 
drivers are excessively burdened by transportation taxes.   
Figure 6.1 Average VMT and Gas Tax paid by Urban and Rural Vehicles in North Carolina  
 
In examining the differences in taxes paid by different demographic groups for both the 
gas tax and VMT tax, the important variable worth examining is fuel economy.  The dual tax 
scenarios being compared include both current VMT and a revenue-neutral tax rate in their 
calculations.  However, the addition of fuel economy in calculating the gas tax takes into account 
that a user driving an automobile with lower fuel economy (say, a rural citizen driving a Ford F-
250) will pay more in taxes per mile than a driver of an automobile with high fuel economy (say, 
an urban citizen driving a Ford Focus hybrid).  This variable is removed in the conversion to a 
VMT fee with the only variable being how much the individual drives.  Thus, even though rural 
drivers drive more than their urban counterparts, they benefit from a VMT fee due to their 
relatively low fuel economy. 
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Figure 6.1 Average VMT and Gas Tax per vehicle paid by low income and non-low income households in North 
Carolina  
 
 
 Issues of income proved to be less of an issue regarding transitioning from a gas tax to a 
VMT fee.  There is no significant difference in the amount paid under either the gas tax or VMT 
fee for both low-income and non-low income drivers in North Carolina.  It is important to note 
that, while vehicles belonging to low income households pay much less in both gas taxes and 
VMT fees, the owners of these vehicles likely pay a much higher percentage of their income in 
either gas taxes or VMT fees, continuing the regressive nature of transportation financing in the 
United States. 
 
The question of whether the United States should adopt a tax on vehicle miles traveled while 
phasing out the gas tax is a settled one in theory.  A VMT fee would allow for a more accurate 
fee to be imposed on drivers (assuming that the fee is set at the right rate and allowed to fluctuate 
based on changing circumstances such as inflation and total VMT, a long proposition by any 
standards, especially given the difficulty in raising the current gas tax).  Depending on the 
technology utilized, a VMT fee could also allow state and local governments to incorporate 
revenue streams such as congestion pricing.  Nonetheless, this study finds that, at least in North 
Carolina, concerns about equity should not preclude a transition from a gas tax to a VMT fee.   
This is especially true given that the assumed parameters of a transition to a VMT fee.  Any 
attempt to raise revenue levels of the HTF (and restore solvency to the nation‟s transportation 
financing mechanism) will necessarily involve raising taxes, be it in the form of a gas tax or a 
VMT fee.  The impacts of such a tax increase lie outside the scope of this study.  However, this 
study provides evidence that a VMT fee structure is not structurally more regressive than the 
current system of transportation revenue collection, the gas tax. 
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5.1 Limitations 
The primary weakness of this study lies in its assumption regarding the future levels of 
funding mechanisms for transportation infrastructure in the United States.  Specifically, this 
study sets the VMT fee rate at a level (0.9 cents per mile) sufficient to match revenue levels in 
2008.  While this allows for a comparison of revenue collection methods, it does not sufficiently 
examine the impact of solving the Highway Trust Fund‟s funding crisis.  The National Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission has recommended tax increases ranging 
from 10 cents a gallon (in the case of a gas tax) to 2.3 cents a mile (in the case of a VMT fee).  
Under both scenarios, the amount of tax paid would increase considerably (especially under the 
VMT fee, which is set at a rate of more than twice the revenue neutral level).  While such work 
is outside the scope of this study, an examination of the impacts of higher tax rates (i.e. a tax 
increase necessary to maintain the solvency of the Highway Trust Fund)  
In essence, this study presumes that the primary factor influencing the cost of driving for 
North Carolinians is the taxation of motor fuels or vehicle miles traveled.  Obviously, this is not 
the case.  In fact, the discussion of equity impacts regarding transportation taxes may be a moot 
point, at least when it comes to the concept of increasing gasoline taxes and instituting a VMT 
tax.  As of March 7
th
, 2010, the average price of a gallon of unleaded gasoline in the United 
States was $3.52, an increase of 77 cents from the previous year.  For the Lower Atlantic region, 
which includes North Carolina, the average price was $3.48, an increase of 75 cents from the 
previous year.  In the grand scheme of things, then, a 10 cent increase in the gasoline tax, 
especially an increase that‟s staged out over the course of several months, would likely go 
unnoticed by the public.  
This is highlighted by the highly inelastic nature of demand for gasoline.  As evidenced by 
the sensitivity analysis conducted by this study, an increase in the cost of gas would have little to 
no effect on the amount of vehicle miles traveled.  Why is this?  There is strong evidence that 
drivers have not always been this insensitive to changes in the cost of gas.  According to Hughes, 
et al (2008) the gas crisis of 2008 (in which prices rose above $4 per gallon for the first time) 
revealed that despite sharp increases in the price of gas (and therefore the cost of driving), 
Americans did not reduce their amount of driving by any significant amount.  This is especially 
revealing compared to the gas crises of the 1970‟s, in which similar increases in the price of gas 
resulted in a much greater change in driver behavior (and has been the source of assumptions 
about price elasticity of gasoline since that time).   
6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based upon the findings of this report, The North Carolina Congressional Delegation should take 
the following actions in upcoming transportation reauthorizations: 
- Support the recommendations of the bipartisan, blue-ribbon NSTIFC and initiate a 
transition to a VMT fee system as soon as possible 
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As demonstrated by this paper‟s findings, a VMT tax poses no great threat to rural or low-
income populations relative to the gas tax.  Indeed, the reduced taxes paid by rural, low-income 
populations (due to low fuel economy) suggest that rural citizens would benefit from a VMT 
relative to their urban counterparts.  This, combined with the increasing inability of the gas tax to 
maintain the solvency of the HTF, further supports the findings of the National Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission that a transition from the current gas tax to 
a VMT tax should be completed within ten years of its initiation.   
- Advocate for state and national level studies of potential issues in transitioning from 
a gas tax to a VMT tax 
As indicated by this study and by relevant literature, the  primary barrier to implementing a VMT 
system is not concerns about equity but rather concerns about implementation (ensuring that the 
fee can be effectively collected) and privacy.  To this extent, North Carolina‟s congressional 
delegation should support efforts to study how these two issues could be alleviated, both at the 
state level through NCDOT and at the federal level through US DOT.   
- Support measures to ensure mobility for the poor, especially the rural poor 
While a VMT tax is not as regressive as a gas tax for North Carolina drivers, a VMT tax would 
still be defined as regressive, since the poor pay a higher proportion of their income in the tax 
than the non-poor under both scenarios.  In order to alleviate this burden, the congressional 
delegation should support funding for measures that would alleviate this burden on the poor.  
These include: 
- Amend the Earned Income Tax Credit to include a credit for vehicle miles traveled 
under a certain income level 
The Federal Government currently provides a tax credit to households based on income and the 
number of children present.  If the gas tax is increased or a transition to a VMT fee is initiated, 
the EITC should be readjusted to account for the increased cost of driving both as a result of 
higher gas prices as well as the changes in transportation revenue mechanisms. 
- Funding for fixed route and demand response public transportation in urban and 
rural areas 
One way to reduce the burden on low income households, especially those living in urban areas, 
is to support funding for public transportation systems, especially those whose primary customer 
base include rural or low-income drivers.  These include traditional fixed-route transportation 
systems as well as demand-response transit systems that provide service for Medicare and 
Medicaid patients as well as rural households without cars.   
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In this paper, I state that I chose North Carolina as a study area due to the states 
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rather than 50.  This is all very true.  However, I should add that the primary (and unstated) 
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my sincere hope that the findings contained in this study will be used by policymakers in 
Washington and Raleigh to make responsible, ethical decisions about the future of transportation 
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